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On appeal from the Park County District Court, the Montana Supreme Court upheld the 
Park Conservation District’s designation of a channel of the Yellowstone River near the City of 
Livingston as part of the natural course of the river as reasonable and worthy of judicial 
deference, even though the record demonstrated that the channel had been continuously used as 
an irrigation conveyance system and local parties had historically referenced the stream with 
inconsistent characterizations.  Looking ahead, this decision illustrates the Court’s strong 
deference to the resolutions and statutory interpretations of the state’s local conservation districts.  
To a lesser degree, the Court’s acceptance of the analytic framework used in determining the 
stream’s classification could potentially broaden the scope of the statute’s application, allowing 
more irrigation conveyance systems to fall within its purview. 
II. Introduction 
In July of 2013, the City of Livingston, Montana appealed the decision of the Park 
County District Court that affirmed the Park Conservation District’s (PCD) determination that a 
channel adjacent to the Yellowstone River near town was a part of the natural course of the river 
and thus subject to the statutory provisions of Montana’s Natural Streambed and Land 
Preservation Act.  The City sought classification of the stream because it believed city property 
was injured by the PCD’s permitting of maintenance operations under the authority of the 
Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act.1  On appeal, the City argued the district court 
erred in upholding the PCD’s determination, contending its conclusion was an arbitrary and 
                                                 
1 City of Livingston v. Park Conservation Dist., 234 MT 2013, ¶ 3, 371 Mont. 303, 307 P.3d 317 (Mont. 2013). 
[Hereinafter “Livingston”] 
capricious abuse of their discretionary authority to issue declaratory rulings for their 
constituents.2  The City further claimed that PCD abused its discretion in failing to adequately 
analyze documents in the record containing several references to the disputed watercourse as a 
“ditch.”3  The Court quickly dismissed these arguments, stating that the PCD’s thorough 
examination of the river’s physical characteristics was sufficient to show that their conclusion 
was reasonable in light of the overriding policy purpose of the Act itself.4  Ultimately, the Court 
held the City failed to show that the PCD reached its classification decision in an arbitrary or 
capricious manner.5 
III. Background 
 The heart of this litigation involves the physical nature of a stream channel adjacent to 
the Yellowstone River, near the town of Livingston, Montana.  Historical evidence shows that 
during periods of runoff, when the river flows are high, water from the Yellowstone flows into 
this channel naturally and returns to the river’s main body downstream.6  Since the 19th century, 
this channel has been utilized by the Heart K Ranch (“Heart”) to transport their vested rights to 
surface water from the river.7  However, Heart does not have a head gate on the channel 
controlling the river’s inflows and, as a result, the Yellowstone’s natural alpine snowmelt regime 
leaves significant accumulations of rock and debris in the channel that must be removed for the 
channel to continue to deliver water to Heart during times of lower flows.8  Heart operates this 
channel maintenance routine under the authority of a permit issued to it by the PCD, pursuant to 
                                                 
2 Id. at ¶ 2. 
3 Id. at ¶ 15. 
4 Id. at ¶ 16. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at ¶ 3. 
7 Livingston, at ¶ 3. 
8 Id. 
the provisions of the Act.9  Immediately adjacent to the channel is property owned by the City.  
The City claims that Heart’s maintenance activities have resulted in injury to their property and 
that the permit issued to Heart to undertake such projects is invalid because the channel itself 
falls outside the scope of the Act, thus stripping PCD of authority to issue the permit.10 
The City petitioned PCD for a declaratory ruling in accordance with the procedure laid 
out by section 75-7-125 of the Montana Code Annotated.11  The PCD accepted the City’s request 
appointing the Chief of the Conservation Districts Bureau as hearing officer for the proceeding.12  
Based on testimony given at a public hearing, exhibits submitted by all parties and a physical 
visit to the site itself, the hearing officer issued findings of fact and a recommendation.13  Shortly 
thereafter, the PCD issued its official Declaratory Ruling on the matter stating that the channel is 
“a flood channel, high water channel, or side channel of the Yellowstone River, and is therefore 
subject to the Act.”14   
Applying the Act, internal administrative regulations and those adopted by the Montana 
Department of Natural Resource and Conservation, the PCD determined that the Yellowstone’s 
dynamic nature created a migration zone, where scouring and deposition of fluvial materials 
continually alter the confines of the system.15  Critical to their conclusion was that during an on-
premise site inspection the PCD “found no evidence of spoil piles to indicate that the channel is a 
man-made ditch.”16  Upon receiving this information, the City sought judicial review from the 
district court, who upheld the PCD’s findings, leading to this appeal.   
IV. Analysis 
                                                 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at ¶ 4. 
12 Livingston, at ¶ 5. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at ¶ 6-7. 
16 Id. at ¶ 7. 
 In the opening section of its analysis, the Court lays out the foundational principles and 
standards that govern the review of a conservation district’s declaratory ruling.  Set out in section 
75-7-125(4) of the Montana Code, a court offering judicial review over these types of decisions 
may reverse or alter a district’s decision only if “substantial rights of the appellant have been 
prejudiced because the decision violates constitutional or statutory provisions; is in excess of 
statutory authority; is affected by error of law; or is arbitrary or capricious, characterized by 
abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.”17  Importantly, the Court 
concluded its analysis of the applicable standard of review by reiterating the principle that mere 
inconsistencies in the evidence, or even a finding of evidentiary pieces supporting an alternate 
conclusion will not suffice to meet the required threshold of arbitrary or capricious.18 
 A review of the legislative history shows that the Act was intended to promote the goals 
of Article II and Article IX of the Montana Constitution and to provide for the preservation and 
protection of the State’s rivers and streams.19  Additionally, the Act lays out the procedural 
process for approval of plans to modify or alter the condition of water bodies held under the 
statute’s authority.20  In acknowledging Heart’s adherence to these guidelines, the Court also laid 
out precedential support for usage of natural streams in conveyance of appropriative rights.21  
Upon analyzing the definitional provisions of all three guiding bodies law22 and prior 
case law requiring districts to analyze these types of decisions under the totality of the 
circumstances23, the Court set aside a few undisputed issues.  Neither party contested that the 
                                                 
17 Id. at ¶ 10. 
18 Livingston, at ¶ 10. 
19 Id. at ¶ 11. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 The Act, the implementing rules of the Montana DNRC and the PCD’s internal rules each provide provisions for 
the definition of a natural stream. 
23 Bitterroot River Protective Assoc. v. Bitterroot Conservation District, 2008 MT 377, ¶ 40, 346 Mont. 507, 198 
P.3d 219 
Yellowstone itself falls within the coverage of the Act’s mandates.  The Court found it similarly 
apparent that the contiguous channel at issue receives substantial amounts of the river’s natural 
flow during specific times of year.24  Ultimately synthesizing these conclusions, the Court’s 
analysis applied the various organizational definitions in conjunction with the legislative intent, 
effectively ending the review of the City’s substantive arguments.25  Yet, the Court summarily 
dissected the rest of the City’s contentions.26  In concluding its analysis, the Court again 
referenced the confines of its own probative framework, reiterating the imposing and high bar 
judicial deference requires.  Succinctly, the Court explained that the City’s claim of an arbitrary 
result was simply without merit based on the diligent and extensive efforts undertaken by the 
PCD.27 
V. Conclusion 
This case represents a definitive example of the Montana Supreme Court applying 
principles of judicial deference and review.  Uniquely, the Court here applies these doctrines to 
an agency operating at the county level, showcasing the Court’s belief in and support for 
logically sound and well-reasoned arguments, regardless of the level of office.  Going forward, 
this opinion may provide a foundation for other local agencies to defend their own bases of 
statutory interpretation whether under the provisions of the Natural Streambed and Land 
Preservation Act or otherwise. 
                                                 
24 Livingston, at ¶ 14. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at ¶ 15. 
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